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ABSTRACT
On July 8, 1980, the Galveston district of the u.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) issued the permits required for
the construction of an onshore deepwater port. The proposed
port expansion project has been the subject of extensive
controversy and litigation. The primary conflict has
centered on the exclusion of a worst case oil spill analysis,
as required by recent Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
regulations.
A rational-deductive approach to this decision leads to
the conclusion that the economically and environmentally
favored choice would have been to include the worst case
analysis in the initial Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
Because of changes in oil import conditions and prices, the
project has probably been delayed to such an extent that it
is no longer economically viable. This discrepancy leads to
important generalizations about agency decision making. The
utility and necessity of the worst case regulation are also
explored.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Port of Galveston has served for many years as a
major refinery and distribution area for both Texas and the
nation. In order to meet a perceived need for an increased
oil handling capacity, an onshore deepwater port was proposed
by Galveston Wharves, a private utility of the city of
Galveston. The expanded port would facilitate oil imports by
allowing deep draft Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC's) to
unload at Galveston. The proposed onshore port met with
considerable opposition, primarily concerning the increased
potential for catastrophic impacts resulting from a major oil
spill in Galveston Bay.
The United States Corps of, Engineers (hereafter referred
to as the Corps) is responsible for permitting, construction
and dredging operations in U.s. waters. Under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the federal official
responsible for a major federal action, such as permitting
construction of a deepwater port, must prepare an
Environmental Impact statement (EIS). The EIS is intended to
ensure that the environmental impacts of major actions are
considered as part of the agency's decision-making process.
This thesis focuses on the decision by the Corps not to
include a worst case oil spill analysis in the EIS for the
This thesis follows the format and style of A Manual fQL
Writers, by Kate A. Turabian.
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proposed deepwater port at Galveston. The study was selected
because it presented two "firsts": 1) this is the first time
a deepwater port has been proposed in a sensitive wildlife
estuary (see Chapter Four), and 2) the litigation resulting
from the proposed project was the first to apply one of a set
of newly issued Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
regulations. The CEQ has an advisory function within the
executive branch and is charged with providing agencies with
additional guidelines for the preparation of EIS's. The
regulation on which the litigation focuses requires that any
scientific uncertainty relating to a project or its impacts
be disclosed in the EIS. If the impacts are not known or if
the impacts of a project cannot be determined using existing
methods, a "worst case" scenario must be formulated and its
effects considered. Along with the environmental impacts of
a low probability/ high risk event, a probability analysis of
such an event must be presented as part of the EIS, according
the CEQ regulations. The current CEQ has made clarification
of the worst case regulation a primary policy issue. At the
present time, the Corps and other federal agencies are
"concerned" and "confused" by the requirement; they are
uncertain when and how a worst case analysis should be
completed. The present case helps clarify by way of example.
Objectives
This thesis draws from a variety of sources and
disciplines. In order to put the following pages in
perspective, these objectives are presented:
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1. To present a factual overview of the case study.
By considering the historical development, it is
expected that the current situation and its
implications for the future can be better
understood.
2. To understand the views of the opposing interests.
These are addressed under the heading of economic
and environmental considerations.
3. To evaluate the decision by the Corps in terms of
the interests involved. This entails examining the
stated goals of the Corps, the proposed project and
NEPA. Within the framework of a case study
approach, this thesis evaluates the Corps' decision
using the "rational-deductive" ideal (see Chapter
3). Briefly stated, this approach involves defining
the goal(s) to be pursued, identifying the available
options and then choosing that option which best
meets the stated goals.
4. Finally, to uncover reasons for the Corps' original
decision and to draw conclusisons and implications
for this and other agency actions.
History of Port Development in the Galveston Area
The first known use of Galveston as a port was in 1824,
at which time it functioned as a provisional port for Mexico.
At that time a few breakwaters were constructed, but
otherwise the port relied solely on the natural water depth
(5) and coastline. Between 1869 and 1873 a mile long
breakwater was constructed to limit the erosion of Galveston
Island and to improve access to navigation. This latter
objective was accomplished by increasing scouring between the
inner and outer channels (Fig. 1). The depth through
Bolivar Roads was increased as a result of a number of
dredging projects. At the turn of the century it was dredged
to approximately 26 feet mean low water (mlw). By 1905 the
channel was deepened naturally to 30 feet mlw due to scouring
J
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as a result of the completion of the north and south jetty.
The authorized depth of the main channels was increased to 34
feet mlw by 1935 and to 36 feet mlw in 1948. The present 40
foot mlw depth was authorized in 1958 and completed in 1966.
Galveston Channel proper was dredged to the same depth in
1975-76. Main navigation channels that terminate at the port
are the Galveston Bay Entrance Channel, Outer Bar Channel,
Inner Bar Channel, Galveston Channel, Texas City Channel,
Houston Ship Channel and the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway
(GIWW) (Fig. 1).
The suggestion to provide a deep draft port at Galveston
was one of many deepwater port proposals to appear in the
United States in the late 1960's. These projects were
originally proposed as a result of decreased U.S. production
and the resulting increased demand for imported oil. The
construction of a Galveston deepwater port was first
suggested in June 1966 during a meeting of Galveston Wharves,
oil companies and tanker chartering firms held by local
Congressman Jack Brooks (6). Authorization for a feasibility
study of a 200,000 dead-weight ton (dwt) capacity superport
in the Galveston-Port Arthur area came in December of 1970.
However, like many other superport projects suffering from a
lack of funding and/or confusion over which federal and state
agencies were to approve the funding, the proposed
feasibility study was never undertaken. In response to these
difficulties and similar problems confronting other ports,
the Deepwater Ports Act (PL 93-627) was enacted. It was
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signed on January 3, 1973 lito regulate commerce, promote
efficiency in transportation, and protect the environment by
establishing procedures for the location, construction, and
operation of deepwater ports off the coasts of the U.S." (7).
It gave the Departments of Transportation and Justice,
Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Trade
Commission each a hand in port licensing, operation and/or
construction.
A sUbsequent study dealing with the establishment of a
Texas deepwater port was undertaken jointly by Texas A&M
University, the Texas Sea Grant Program and the Texas
Superport Study Corporation. This was the first of eight
major studies conducted by this and other groups centering on
the need and feasibility of a Texas superport (8). The
overall conclusions strongly favored port expansion to
accomodate a projected increase in oil traffic. However, an
offshore port was concluded to be environmentally preferable
in all of the studies and economically preferable in most.
Galveston Wharves filed dredging permit application
#10400 with the Corps in June, 1974. The permit would have
authorized a 67 ft. mlw channel depth. However, the permit
was not processed at that time; the applicants chose to
wait for the results of further environmental and economic
impact studies.
In December, 1975, the Public Works Committee of the
U.S. Congress passed a resolution authorizing another study
of a Texas deepwater port. This was combined with an ongoing
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study by the Corps which compared a number of different Texas
cities as alternative locations for a deep draft port.
Comparing the economic and environmental impacts of an
onshore versus an offshore facility, this study concluded
that both were economically feasible given the status of the
petrochemical industry at that time. However, the study also
concluded that an offshore port would be the environmentally
preferred alternative, since no bays or estuaries would be
disturbed by the laying of a pipeline. Furthermore the
effects of oil spilled offshore would be less immediate and
therefore less detrimental.
Concurrent with these plans for the Galveston project,
the development of a potentially competetive offshore port in
the Freeport, Texas area was being considered by Seadoc, Inc.
Seadoc was a Texas corporation formed to own, plan, develop
and operate the facility. It consisted of a large number of
prominent industry groups including Cities Service Company,
Continental Pipe Line Service, Crown-Seadock Pipe Line
Corporation, Dow Chemical Company, Exxon Pipe Line Company,
Toronto Pipe Line Company, Mobil Oil Corporation, Phillips
Investment Corporation, and Shell Oil Company.
The Texas Deepwater Port Authority was established when
several of the participating companies pUlled out of the
Seadoc Corporation in 1977. Recession and higher oil prices
combined with an overall decrease in demand for oil led many
of the companies to decide that they could not justify the
substantial investment in a new port. In 1980,the Freeport
7
offshore project underwent another metamorphosis resulting in
a scaled down version and was renamed Texas Offshore Port
(TOP). Its backers included Phillips, Dow Chemical and
Seaway Pipeline Companies. TOP was issued a license in
September, 1981. However, the port at Freeport will probably
never be built, given the recent decline in oil
transportation in the area (9).
Current Status of the Problem
The current permit application was filed in July, 1976
as an amendment to the original application #10400, which had
been held back two years earlier. It proposes deepening and
extending Galveston Harbor and Channel to allow access to
VLCC's of up to 320,000 dwt. A crude oil tanker berthing and
offloading facility would be built on Pelican Island (Fig.
1), connected by pipeline with storage facilities at Texas
City, Beaumont, Houston and Freeport.
On July 8, 1980, the Corps issued five permits
authorizing the private construction of an onshore deepwater
port and crude oil terminal at Galveston. The permits were
issued jointly to Galveston Wharves (Wharves) and the
Pelican Terminal Corporation (Pelco), who, along with the
Chicago Iron and steel Company and Northville Industries,
would provide the financial backing for the project. The
location of the proposed "superport" terminal is Pelican
Island, located just inside Galveston Bay and adjacent to
Galveston City. The entrance to the port is Galveston Bay,
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which has served for many years as a commercial waterway for
crude oil tankers averaging 50,000 dwt. The proposed project
would increase the maximum tonnage of allowed tankers from
50,000 to 320,000 deadweight ton VLCC's.
The proposed project has sparked considerable
controversy, primarily over the potential effects of a major
oil spill within Galveston Bay. Two groups emerged
representing the local public's split reaction to the
project: 1) stop the Terminal On Pelican Island (STOP), which
feared oil spill impacts and their associated fire and
explosion potential, and 2) the Joint Organization for a
Better Seaport (JOBS), which viewed port expansion as a
means of increased employment and tax base.
The Bay is Texas' largest estuary and serves as spawning
9round and critical habitat for many species of wildlife,
including fish and migratory birds (10). For example, much
of Texas' commercial fishing industry is based on fish that
spend part of their life cycle in the Bay (11). The
recreational value of the area is also cited as an important
reason for protecting it from the effects of a major oil
spill (12). These issues will be discussed in greater detail
in Chapters Four and Five.
In 1978, subsequent to permit applications filed on
behalf of the superport project, work began on the
EIS as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA) (13). After issuance of the Draft Environmental
Impact Statement (DEIS) in April, 1979 and following a
9
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required comment and hearing period, the Final Environmental
Impact statement (FElS) was filed in September, 1979. Based
on the Corps' mandate under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (Clean Water Act) (14), and in accordance with
Corps regulations, the Galveston District Engineer issued
five permits on JUly 8, 1980 authorizing the deepening of the
channel and construction of an oil terminal, tank farm and
associated pipeline systems.
On May 19, 1981, the Sierra Club, along with other
environmental organizations, sued the Corps (Sierra v.
Sigler), challenging the adequacy of the FElS and the Corps'
review of the permit application. The plaintiffs' strongest
argument concerned the failure of the Corps to conduct a
"worst case" oil spill analysis as part of the ElS. The
plaintiffs pointed to the newly issued CEQ regulation (15)
which required agencies to perform a worst case analysis when
proceeding with an action involving important information
beyond the current state of the art of existing technology.
Since the Galveston project presented the first time a
deepwater port had been proposed in a sensitive estuarine
environment, there was uncertainty surrounding the effects of
oil spilled in the area. For example, the Corps claimed that
the state of the art in very accurate oil spill analysis was
limited to a 24-hour dispersion model. However, enough wind
and current information was available to "reasonably
forecast" the movement of spilled oil (16). Both parties and
the court agreed that the worst possible case would involve a
11
total cargo loss by a VLCC inside the channel. The
defendents argued that a worst case analysis was not required
for a variety of reasons including the uncertainty
surrounding its impact. The arguments of both the plaintiffs
and defendents will be discussed below and in greater depth
in later chapters.
The District Court in Galveston agreed with the Corps,
ruling that the worst case regulation did not apply in this
case (17), since such a scenario would be "remote and
speculative". On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in New Orleans reversed the District Court's decision. In
its arguments the Appeals Court ruled that the effects of a
major oil spill by a supertanker within an estuary
constituted important information "beyond the state of the
art", and was therefore "precisely what was required by the
CEQ regulation" (18).
The Corps is presently in the process of preparing a
Supplementary Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS).
Following its completion, the SEIS will be circulated for
comment and review for a forty-five day period. The District
Engineer is then required to reconsider the permit decision
in light of the SEIS. The entire process is not expected to
be completed before late 1986(19).
Organization
This thesis is organized into six chapters. This first
chapter has presented introductory material and has provided
an historical account of the case. The second chapter
12
reviews the material relevant to this study concerning NEPA,
EIS's the CEQ and the Corps. Chapter three describes the
method used in carrying out the investigation and subsequent
analysis. It also explains the origin of the data. Chapters
four and five contain parallel discussions of environmental
and economic considerations for Galveston area port
development and the preparation of a worst case analysis.
Chapter four presents the sources of environmental goals and
values as they relate to the project. This chapter also
presents the options available to the Corps, and reasons and
ramifications of pursuing each option. Chapter five
focuses on economic considerations. The last chapter
concludes the thesis with a summary and discussion of the
implications of the study.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED MATERIAL
Introduction
This chapter reviews the literature topically. Although
the rationale for the CEQ "worst case" regulation and much
of the subsequent discussion comes from more general
environmental legal principals, the Sigler case was the first
court case dealing with the specific regulation. The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the EIS requirement
and general environmental case law lay the foundation for the
worst case regulation; therefore they will be discussed
first.
The National Environmental Policy Act
A great deal of literature exists on both the
substantive and procedural aspects of the NEPA. The
substance of NEPA can be found by examining the legislative
history of the Act. The Act was conceived to meet the need
for a coherent national environmental policy and for a
greater understanding of ecological facts and processes.
These needs were first articulated in Congress in the House
report, Managing ~ Enyironment(l). This report outlined
the relationship between the objective of environmental
quality and management within the federal government. The
report concluded that a single national policy would make it
easier to incorporate the isolated and often conflicting
policies focusing on conservation, esthetics, recreation,
16
economic development and human health.
Another Congressional report was pUblished by the
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, chaired by Senator
Henry Jackson. The National Policy for the Environment (2)
considered a wide range of national environmental policy
issues, emphasizing human health, happiness, economic
welfare, and physical survival.
Environmental quality does not mean indiscriminate
preservation ism, but it does imply a careful
examination of alternative means of meeting human
needs before sacrificing natural species of
environments to other competing demands ••• the total
environmental needs of man--ethical, esthetic, physical,
and intellectual, as well as economic, must be taken
into account ••• (3)
When NEPA was enacted in January, 1970, it produced a
flurry of commentary and analysis. Much of this discussion
centered on legal actions resulting from the Act. A great
deal of the commentary that is important to this study
centers on the procedural versus the substantive requirements
imposed by NEPA; it is often difficult to separate the two.
Both approaches are relevant to this study. The procedural
argument as it relates to the present problem focuses on the
CEQ regulation which specifies the inclusion of a worst case
analysis as part of the EIS process in certain situations.
The court cases and their sUbsequent commentary focusing on
the procedural requirements imposed by NEPA are discussed in
the next section. The substantive approach argues that even
without the regulations, the intent of NEPA would require a
worst case analysis. Although the courts differ in approach
to this question, most see NEPA as imposing some substantive
17
duty on agencies.
The substantive versus procedural debate over the effect
of NEPA is expressed well in the question "what happens if
the EIS is perfect, the project is an environmental disaster,
and the agency decides to go ahead anyway?" (4). Although
the courts differ in their approach to this question, most
see NEPA as imposing some substantive duties on the agencies.
Judicial opinion varies with regard to the extent of these
duties, as evidenced by the following representative cases.
One of the first cases reinforcing the substantive ideal
of environmental protection involved the Corps. In Zabel v.
Tabb (5), the court reviewed the issue of whether the Corps
could deny a permit solely on environmental grounds. The
developer of a Florida trailer park argued that the Corps
could only deny him a permit in order to protect navigation.
The court, however, held that federal agencies, under NEPA,
had the responsibility to promote environmental goals.
In Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. AEC (6), the
plaintiffs charged that the AEC's issuance of a permit for
construction of a nuclear power plant was based on an
inadequate EIS. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee
claimed that the AEC's consideration of the alternatives was
incomplete and therefore in violation of NEPA. The court
ruled that federal agencies must weigh environmental impacts
against economic and social factors in a "finely tuned
systematic analysis". The D.C. Circuit court in Calvert
Cliffs relied on NEPA's requirement that alternatives to a
18
proposed project be discussed "to the fullest extent
possible" (102) (c) (iii). Although the court denied that it
could reverse substantive agency decisions on their merit,
procedural requirements were found to be subject to a strict
standard of compliance. The court did not require maximum
mitigation of adverse environmental impacts. However, in his
comments, Judge Wright stressed the substantive importance of
NEPA, pointing to the directive that agencies use "all
practicable means and measures to protect environmental
values". While it is impossible to consider all of the
environmental effects, it is "practicable" (sec lOla) (7) to
consider the worst case. According to Yost (8), the worst
case analysis is the best practicable way to deal with
environmental impacts which are of low probability but would
have a catastrophic impact. It would provide a scenario from
which to evaluate the effects of a high impact/ low
probability event.
In the 1979 case of Andrus v. Sierra Club (9) the
Supreme Court relied on the CEQ's interpretation of NEPA as
more than just a procedural statute. The court found that
the EIS is only the "outward sign that environmental values
and consequences have been considered". In addition, the
"thrust of 102(2) (c) is thus that environmental
concerns be integrated in the very process of
agency decisionmaking ••• for this reason the [CEQ]
regulations require federal agencies to integrate
the NEPA process with other planning at the earliest
possible time to insure that planning and decisions
reflect environmental values •.• " (10).
Perhaps the case dealing with the issue of substance
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most directly is another decision involving the Corps. In
the Gillham Dam case, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
opposed the damming of Arkansas' Cossatot River for
environmental reasons. The dam was to be built on the last
free-flowing river in the area. EDF argued that the Corps
did not consider leaving the river in its free-flowing state
by using non-structural flood protection alternatives (11).
On Appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court affirmed the district
court's ruling to allow the damming of the river. However,
the circuit court found that the merits of the case were
reviewable under NEPA 101 and 102(1) by the standard of
"arbitrary and capricious":
The language of NEPA, as well as its legislative
history make it clear that the Act is more than an
environmental 'full disclosure' law. NEPA was intended
to effect substantive changes in decision making. (12)
Most authors see NEPA as imposing both procedural and
substantive mandates. Baker, Kaming and Morrison discuss the
lack of a definition of the substantive role of NEPA: "To
date, neither the courts nor the federal government have
made much progress in defining or clarifying what constitutes
the substantive role of an environmental impact statement"
(13). On the other hand, they point to the fact that
"procedural steps ••• involve matters of substance" (14).
Section 102(2) (c) of NEPA sets forth the procedural steps to
be followed. However, choosing which alternatives are
discussed and how they are treated are issues of substance.
The concluding remarks by the authors on this issue are
20
that "the issue is not closed, and efforts to develop
mechanisms for enabling the courts to rule using substantive
standards will continue" (15).
Findlay and Farber take a similar position. The
arbitrary and capricious standard of review is applicable to
NEPA cases, they claim. "There has been a growing tendency
in environmental cases for courts to apply the 'arbitrary and
capricious' test in a way that resembles the 'substantial
evidence' test. This has become known as the 'hard look'
approach" (16). Federal agencies are therefore subject to
review, both of their procedures and of their factual
determinations. This work offers an explanation for why no
court has reversed an agency's decision because of
substantive flaws. It is easier, it is argued, for a court
to find the EIS procedurally inadequate than to directly
attack its substantive merits. Although no court has ruled
on substantive grounds, nor is it likely to do so according
to these and other authors (17), the goal or intent of NEPA
is to produce substantive changes in environmental
decisionmaking. The worst case requirement, as discussed
later, was issued to facilitate these decisions.
The Environmental Impact Statement
Substantive policies of NEPA are set forth in
section 101 of the Act. The procedural tool, the EIS,
requires agencies to consider environmental concerns and
information. These provisions are contained in section
102, which reads as follows:
21
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest
extent possible ••• (2) all agencies of the federal
government shall •••
(c) include in every recommendation oc report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of a proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot by
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintainance of and enhancement
of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable committment of
resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented.
The EIS serves as a reviewable document with specified
contents as outlined by NEPA and the CEQ. Prior to NEPA no
comprehensive legislation existed requiring environmental
information and effects be addressed. The EIS process also
works to further the substantive intent of NEPA by bringing
the public and other agencies into the decisionmaking
process. Section l02(c) requires participating agencies
to contact other agencies with jurisdiction over or special
expertise in the issues involved. The statement, along with
comments received, must be made available to the public.
This additional input and insight serves to inform the agency
of environmental consequences of a project that may otherwise
be unknown to them. An outside reviewer may also have the
objectivity to suggest different alternatives. It has been
suggested that the pressure of having the public aware of the
rationale used and the factors considered in the decision
process lead to better decisions (18). Although the EIS
provision does not mention judicial enforcement, Calvert
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Cliffs established that "judicially enforceable duties" (19)
were imposed on federal agencies through the NEPA process.
This opinion has been incorporated into case law.
The content and scope of an EIS are issues that have
received a great deal of attention in the literature.
Specifically relevant to this discussion are the duties of an
agency in cases of scientific uncertainty. Two critical
questions are: 1) Can agencies rely solely on existing
information, or must new information be generated if it is
necessary to assess the impact of a project? and 2) If
existing methods of obtaining information are inadequate to
answer relevant questions, must new methods be developed? If
the purpose of the EIS is to anticipate and discuss the
environmental consequences of a proposed action, then the EIS
would be meaningless without accurate information. Often the
information needed is not available or readily attainable.
This problem was discussed in Scientists' Institute for
Public Information v. AEC (20). This case dealt with the
issue of whether the cumulative impacts of an entire program
for breeder reactors needed to be addressed in the EIS or if
the effects of individual reactors could be addressed
separately. The Atomic Energy Commission claimed that a
programmatic EIS was not necessary since the future,
cumulative effects were not known. The court, however, ruled
that the impact of the whole program must be assessed. The
"rule of reason", originating in NRDC v. Morton was found to
be the test for determining which alternatives must be
2J
considered in the EIS and how thoroughly they must be
considered. The court also held that time and resource
limitations prevent every conceivable alternative from being
addressed. However, one of the functions of a NEPA
statement is to indicate the extent to which environmental
effects are unknown; "••• [i]mplicit in the rule of reason is
the overriding statutory duty of compliance with impact
statements procedures to the fullest extent possible" (21).
Both the alternatives and potential impacts considered in the
EIS must be thorough; "reasonable forecasting and speculation
is ••• important in NEPA"(22). One commentator writes, "NEPA
is quintessentially a prospective statute; it requires
agencies to look into the future to make informal guesses
about the eventual consequences of proposed actions" (23).
In NRDC v. NRC (Vermont Yankee) (24) the court ruled
that NEPA requires "disclosure of uncertainty and significant
risks" (25). The costs of uncertainty are important in
assessing environmental impacts. The court considered
environmental risks to be significant if the probability of
damage is high or if the damage is severe, regardless of the
probability. Anderson (26) writes, " [w]hen the uncertainties
are especially large, as when the action is the first of its
kind, 'full disclosure' would seem to require that the agency
establish a system for monitoring the impacts". It is
specifically to deal with such high risk or catastrophic
events that the worst case requirement was created.
The procedural tool of NEPA, the EIS, requires agencies
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to develop ways in sec. 102(2) (B) to "insure that presently
unquantified environmental amenities and values be given
appropriate consideration ••• ". Additional, more specific
procedural requirements are set forth in the CEQ guidelines.
The Council on Environmental Quality
The purpose of the CEQ is to advise the President on
environmental policy matters. The CEQ has the responsibility
to elaborate on NEPA's procedural requirements. An Executive
Order issued in March, 1970 (27) called on the CEQ to develop
guidelines for federal agencies to follow in the preparation
and review of EIS's.
Three sets of guidelines have been issued by the CEQ
beginning with an interim set in 1970, followed by a revised
set in 1971 and a third in 1973. The interim guidelines were
general and offered primarily procedural advice. Their main
contributions to the EIS process included publicizing the
statements, requiring EIS's for highly controversial actions
and the creation of an optional draft statement. The draft
statement provides a preliminary statement for review and
comment by the interested public.
The 1971 revised guidelines attempted to include
environmental considerations in the decision-making process
"as early as possible, and in all cases prior to agency
decision"(29). These guidelines discussed the range of
issues to be incorporated in agency procedures more
specifically. They also set a minimum public review and
comment period following the filing of the DEIS and PElS.
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The 1973 revisions to the CEQ guidelines were more
detailed and involved more substantive NEPA goals.
They stressed meeting general national environmental goals
and NEPA's specific objectives (30). They also required that
considerations that competed with environmental values be
explicitly addressed in the ElS.
The latest revision was the issuance of the CEQ
regulations in 1978 (31). These regulations concern all
subsections of 102(2). They are premised on the assumption
that the structure of the decision best attains the goal of
"not better documents but better decisions" (i.e. emphasis on
substance) and also provide agencies with more detailed
procedural requirements.
There is little academic research related to the new CEQ
regulations. There are essentially two reasons for this.
First, they are relatively recent and second, the Sigler case
is the first time the regulations have been brought to court.
The appeal of the Sigler case was decided on January 20,
1983, and since it was the first court case requiring a worst
case analysis, it provided agencies, consultants and the
academic community with the first indication of how the
courts would interpret the worst case regulation. Some of
the resultant commentary dealt specifically with the
regulation and its application to the Sigler case while other
commentators attempted to tie the regulation to the intent of
NEPA (32).
Two articles by Yost, the chairperson of the CEQ at
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the time the regulations were issued, discuss the importance
of the CEQ regulations in upholding the intent of NEPA (33).
The earlier Yost article is a justification for the entire
package of regulations and only briefly mentions the worst
case regulation and its basis. The regulations are intended
to clarify specific requirements for preparing EIS's. They
also provide agencies with guidelines to make EIS preparation
more uniform among agencies. The later paper deals more
specifically with the worst case regulation. Without them,
Yost claims, the court in Sigler would not have produced the
same ruling. However, the author later agreed that a worst
case analysis could have been required on other grounds; the
regulations only codified existing case law.
Other analyses of the regulation were published prior
to its application in the Sigler case. Liebesman (34) argued
that the regulations alone are not enough to further NEPA's
"substantive mandate". Only agencies can integrate NEPA
goals into decision-making. Another commentator, McChesney,
takes the opposing view. This author points to the fact that
the rule had not been applied prior to the Sigler case. In
general, he claims, court decisions playa larger role than
the existence of regulations, noting that prior to the Sigler
case, few EIS's addressed the worst case issue and none
addressed it by name. In practice, neither of these
arguments alone suffices. Taken together, they illustrate
the interaction between regulations, agency actions and the
evolution of case law.
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The current CEQ has responded to agency confusion over
the worst case regulation by threatening to withdraw or
revise it. A draft proposal by a Reagan administration task
force would require that an impact be "reasonably foreseable"
before the worst case analysis be prepared. A similar idea
was proposed in 1984, arguing that agencies wasted time and
money by considering the impacts of low probability events.
This proposal met with strong opposition. Another possible
problem with the regulations is the opportunity they present
for agencies to shortcut necessary environmental analyses.
In Sierra Club v. Corps of Engineers (concerning New York's
Westway project) (35), the court ruled that the Corps acted
irresponsibly in preparing a worst case analysis instead of
completing a necessary two to three year study.
The Corps of Engineers
A number of books have been written about the Corps by
outside observers. Many of the earlier efforts deal solely
with the construction projects of the Corps and are
condemnatory. Two of these are The Dark Missouri (36) and
Muddy Waters (37). Both deal with the politics and economics
of Corps' water projects. The first book condemns the Corps
for its shortsightedness and economically questionable
methods of choosing projects. The second book accuses the
Corps of committing federal funds without concern for their
long-term profitability. The preface to this volume
concludes that "(i)t is to be doubted whether any Federal
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agency in the history of this country has so wantonly wasted
money on worthless projects as the Corps of Engineers ll (38).
Many recent authors have been more generous in their
assessment of the Corps. Mazmanian and Nienaber (39)
concluded from their study of the Corps that the agency
Ilseemed to be making a concerted effort to comply with both
the spirit and the letter of the law". Soon after the
enactment of NEPA, the Corps underwent major self-imposed
reorganization in its decision-making process to incorporate
NEPA requirements. Environmental departments within the
Corps are seen as necessary evils, according to another
survey by Mazmanian and Nienaber. It impedes the economic
development and construction that the Corps perceives as its
primary objective. This study credits the Corps, after a bad
start, with above average procedural performance by the mid-
1970's. The book concludes that the Corps is a politically
astute organization, in tune with the political necessities
of complying with NEPA, even if the sUbstantive goals
contradict their own pro-development stance.
Andrews (40) accuses the Corps of treating EIS's as
"paperwork documentation exercises". He concludes that it is
possible for agencies to comply with procedural requirements
"without necessarily making the changes in their substantive
actions that the procedures were intended to bring about"
(41). Most of the EIS's found to be substantially more
complete were those associated with litigation alleging
violation of NEPA -- i.e. the Corps responded to project-
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specific threats. Very few Corps projects were cancelled as
a result of NEPA requirements; some were modified, but the
majority were just postponed.
These two studies lead to the conclusion that the Corps
has had a great deal of experience with EIS's. At least
procedurally, the Corps should be expert at getting their
projects through the regulatory system and when litigation
results, at successfully arguing disputed projects in the
courts. However, of the NEPA cases filed in 1982, the Corps
had the worst track record, with eight out of twenty-nine-or
more than one quarter of the cases-- ending in injunctions.
Four general criticisms were made of almost all EIS's
prepared by the Corps: 1) they did not provide enough detail
regarding significant adverse effects; 2) they did not
consider areas of uncertainty, nor did they consider
secondary impacts; 3) they were deficient in their discussion
of the alternatives; 4) they often presented the opinions of
the District Engineer, unsupported by documentation.
Although the data on which these studies are based are not
readily available and therefore not verifiable, it may be
assumed from the foregoing that many of these cases were
found to be deficient in substance. Consequently, the Sigler
case appears to be unusual in light of the recent history of
the Corps, since it was found to be procedurally deficient.
Summary
NEPA has been interpreted by the courts and commentators
as imposing both substantive and procedural requirements.
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Support for the substantive intent of the Act is found in the
legislative history leading up to the NEPA, subsequent case
law and commentary. Substantive issues involve the need for
more environmentally sensitive decisions. Making
environmental decisions when scientific uncertainty exists
has been the focus of a great deal of commentary and
litigation. The CEQ worst case analysis arose in response to
the need for more specific procedural requirements for EIS's
in such cases. It attempts to codify existing case law to
make EIS preparation both easier and more uniform. The worst
case analysis has its roots in both the procedure and
substance of NEPA; justification for the worst case
requirement can be found in both substantive and procedural
arguments. This chapter also discussed the Corps as the
object of scrutiny for their environmental attitudes and
policies. In the past, numerous Corps projects have been
held up in the courts because of procedural noncompliance.
The agency has responded by becoming, in general, very
politically astute and procedurally complete.
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CHAPTER III
INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE
Method
This study utilizes a qualitative, case study approach
to assess the decision by the Corps not to include the worst
case analysis in the EIS for a proposed Galveston, Texas
deepwater port. According to Black and Champion, "a case
study, basically, is a depiction either of a phase or the
totality of relevant experience of some selected datum"(l).
Procedurally, a case study approach allows the greatest
amount of flexibility. It is based on the assumption that
"much can be learned from an attempt to relate the two worlds
of academic reflection and political (and administrative)
action" (2).
The objectives of this study as outlined in Chapter One
include 1) providing an historical background of the
Galveston region and the conditions leading to the worst case
requirement for the port, 2) presenting the views of opposing
interests, 3) evaluating the Corps' decision, and 4)
suggesting reasons for the decision made and discussing
the implications of the case.
The historical background of the area was derived from
secondary data sources. These include the EIS's from this
and previously proposed port expansion projects. The
historical events are presented for the purpose of
understanding the economic importance of port development in
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the area and the ecological systems present there.
The second objective, that of presenting the views of
the interested parties, was primarily accomplished through
the review of secondary data, i.e., information already
collected by other sources. Past activities, arguments
presented in court, articles in local newspapers, letters
and responses to the DEIS were all reviewed to help gain an
understanding of the parties' views. The FEIS and the
decision document, which is the Corps' public rationale for
issuing the dredging permits, provide additional insight into
the Corps' perception of the issues. When these secondary
sources were unavailable or incomplete, interviews were
conducted to further elucidate and clarify the positions of
persons and groups involved. Respondents were chosen on the
basis of their familiarity with the issues, their expertise,
and their accessibility. For instance, Colonel Sigler, the
Corps official responsible for issuing the permits, had left
the Galveston District and was not available for comment.
Principal contacts included Charles Harbaugh, head of the
Environmental Resources Branch of the Galveston District
Corps of Engineers; Roy Hann, Jr., head of the Environmental
Engineering Department at Texas A&M University who has
conducted numerous oil spill studies in the area since the
early 1960's; Nicholas Yost, chairperson of the CEQ at the
time the worst case regulation was issued; Dinah Bear,
chairperson of the CEQ at the time of the Sigler case; Eugene
Poe, Jr., Deputy Director of Port Affairs at the Port of
)6
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Galveston; Aurey Selig, Comptroller for Galveston Wharves;
and Herman Rudenberg of the Galveston Area Sierra Club.
A discussion of the limitations in study design is in
order here. A major drawback of the method lies in the fact
that it may not be easily replicable. By its nature, a case
study runs the risk of researcher bias, since not every facet
of the case can be considered in detail, but only those
aspects that the researcher considers important or relevant.
In addition, the primary sources, and frequently the
secondary data sources used in this study, come from
individuals or groups with vested interests. Attempts to
minimize these biases were made by consulting a number of
sources on both sides of the issues. Disagreements and
inconsistencies between the groups are discussed and an
attempt is made to understand their origin.
A case stUdy design can be used to test theories or 1\
--
hypotheses "provided that the investigator has prepared a
activity" (3). This thesis analyzes the information
primarily on the basis of the rational-deductive ideal or
rational-comprehensive method, as explained by Braybrooke and
theoretical framework within which to cast his research
Lindblom (4) and Simon (5). According to traditional
economic theory, man is assumed to be rational. "Rational
man" or "economic man" (and their brother "administrative
man") is assumed to know the relevant aspects of his
environment. Although this knowledge may not be complete, it
is "at least impressively clear and voluminous". He is also
assumed to have a stable and ordered set of preferences and
be able to calculate which of the alternative courses of
action available to him would best reach the desired goal.
The rational-deductive system was chosen because of its
simplicity of design and because of its similarity to the
stated approach taken by the Corps in preparing EIS's (6).
Essentially, the rational-deductive evaluative method
involves a two-step approach. First, the value(s) to be
pursued are identified. This study discusses the
environmental or economic history and significance of the
Galveston area together with the sources of these same values
under the headings of "environmental considerations" and
"economic considerations" (see Figure 3). Then the
alternative decisions or policies to promote those values are
considered (7). The motivations and ramifications of
pursuing either course of action are then considered.
In order to simplify further, the rational-deductive
approach is applied separately to two sets of values in this
thesis. A great deal of the more recent literature on
decision theory focuses on the shortcomings and limitations
of traditional rational or economic decision-making. Figure
four compares the characteristics of this method with those
of its most-cited alternative, that of successive limited
comparisons or incrementalism. Difficulty in constructing a
workable rational-deductive system results when conflicting
values need consideration. According to Simon,
"administrative man" restructures decision problems by 1)
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Rational-Deductive
(Comprehensive)
1. Clarification of values
or objectives usually pre-
requisite to empirical
analysis of alternative
policies.
2. Policy-formulation is
therefore approached through
a means-end analysis: First
the ends are isolated, then
the means to achieve them
are sought.
3. The test of a "good"
policy is that it can be
shown to be the most appro-
priate means to the desired
ends.
4. Analysis is comprehen-
sive; every important rele-
vant factor is taken into
account.
5. Theory is often heavily
relied upon.
Successive Limited Comparisons
(Incremental)
1. Selection of value goals
and empirical analysis of the
needed action are not distinct
from another but are closely
intertwined.
2. Since means and ends are
not distinct, means-end
analysis is often inappro-
priate or limited.
3. The test of a "good" policy
is typically that various
analysts find themselves
agreeing on a policy (without
their agreeing that it is the
appropriate means to an agreed
objective).
4. Analysis is drastically
limited: i) Important possible
outcomes are neglected.
ii) Important alternative pot-
ential policies are neglected.
iii) Important affected values
are neglected.
5. A succession of comparisons
greatly reduces or eliminates
reliance on theory.
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FIGURE 4: Comparison of characterisitics of two methods
(From Charles Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'",
XIX Public Administration Review, Spring 1959, p.al.)
reducing the multivaried goals to single valued constants and
2) reducing the range of choices by recognizing only the most
obvious relationships. In this case the multivaried goals
are reduced to environmental and economic goals in two
separate analyses. The range of choices include the
inclusion or exclusion of the worst case analysis and
discussion is limited to a consideration of the effects of
each choice. In this way, the often cited problems with the
model are avoided. Figure three outlines the steps taken in
carrying out the two analyses.
The Corps' statement of policy (8), following NEPA,
requires consideration of the sometimes conflicting concerns
of conservation, economics, aesthetics, environmental,
historical, fish and wildlife, water quality and other
considerations. For the purposes of this study, the
conflicting interests are grouped into economic and
environmental values. These two sets of values correspond to
the two required considerations imposed on the Corps by two
separate mandates -- the economic benefit-cost requirement
established by the Flood Control Act of 1936 and the
environmental quality requirement established by NEPA. A
study by Mazmanian and Nienaber found that economic and
environmental interests overlapped negligibly for Corps
projects. People who responded to draft EIS's or were
otherwise involved in the planning process of a proposed
action identified themselves according the following
classification: 1) those primarily concerned with the
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environmental effects of the project, 2) those with personal
property or commercial or economic interests and 3) those who
were just curious. In other words, people were either
concerned with economic or environmental impacts. Economic
and environmental values, in addition to typically being
incompatable, are in many ways incomparable. For example,
there is the common problem of translating the intangible
environmental costs and benefits into economic terms. One
group of authors discusses the problem as follows:
Whenever possible, quantification based cost-benefit
analysis processes should be avoided. They involve
a large number of assumptions which may not be
defensible. NEPA recognizes in Section 102(2) (b)
the existence of non-quantifiable' factors or values
which cannot be considered other than arbitrarily,
in quantification analysis. The required balancing
of project costs and benefits should fully describe
the issues and the importance ascribed to each, but
should not extend to obscuring or hiding the
assumptions in artificial quantification (9).
The final rationale for separating the analysis into
environmental and economic values is that these were the
criteria on which the two parties based their arguments in
the Sigler case. The Sierra Club is a group established for
the purpose of defending environmental interests. The Corps
of Engineers, by contrast, is more committed to economic
development (see Chapter Two, discussion of Corps). For
these reasons, the rational-deductive approach will be
applied separately to the two sets of considerations.
The choices available to the Corps, for the purposes of
this study, are limited to either including or excluding the
worst case analysis. The probable environmental effects of a
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decision to include and not to include the worst case
analysis are discussed. The second parallel analysis is then
undertaken based on economic considerations. This provides
a workable framework within which to study this case. It is
not expected that the Corps took this approach, since the
final permit decision was based on many considerations, and
ultimately, on a subjective "public interest" rationale.
However, environmental and economic considerations cover most
of those required of the Corps by both environmental law and
Corps policy.
The fourth objective involves discussing the
ramifications of the decision not to do the worst case
analysis. Here, the discussion goes beyond the rational-
deductive model to compare its results with the actual choice
made by the Corps. Implications specific to the Galveston
project are considered, and then points on which lessons can
and cannot be generalized are explored.
This approach yields three possible results. First, if
neither interest (economic or environmental) benefits from
the inclusion of a worst case analysis in the EIS, one would
conclude that the CEQ regulation needs to be re-examined.
This result would indicate that the worst case requirement
serves no real purpose. The second possible result is that
only one of the interests favors the inclusion of a worst
case analysis. If this is the case, a reason must be sought
for the Corps' choice to exclude the analysis to the
advantage of this interest. Finally, if it is determined, as
4)
hypothesized, that both economic and environmental interests
benefit from a worst case analysis, then it can be concluded
that it should have been done. If this is the case, possible
explanations for its exclusion must be sought.
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CHAPTER IV
Environmental Considerations
Introduction
The primary legal dispute in Sierra Club v. Sigler
concerned the question of whether the worst case oil spill
analysis should have been included in the original EIS.
In court, the Sierra Club argued that the worst case analysis
was an unfulfilled procedural requirement. Outside of court,
some environmental organizations were willing to accept the
project with better environmental protection measures in the
EIS (1), while others felt that the area was too sensitive to
support the project under any conditions (2). This chapter
explores these arguments in the context of the rational-
deductive model. The Corps made the arguments in court that
the CEQ worst case regulation did not apply, and that the
analysis would have been too "remote and speculative" since
there was not enough scientific information on which to base
it. In interviews Corps personnel argued at different times
that 1) they thought they had done a worst case analysis (3)
and 2) that the language of the statute was "so expansive"
that it was virtually impossible to spell out the worst
possible case scenario.
In this section, the rational-deductive model will be
applied to environmental aspects of the Galveston port
expansion project. The first step in this method is goal
definition. In the first part of this chapter, environmental
goals and their sources will be clarified. The second step
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in the rational-deductive approach considers the options; the
Corps' options in this study are limited by study design to
either the inclusion of exclusion of the worst case analysis.
The rational-deductive model is considered in contrast to its
alternative, incrementalism, in the previous chapter. The
decision whether or not to include a worst case analysis
can be approached by considering the ramifications and
reasons for and against each alternative. Included in the
term "environmental" will be conservation, aesthetic, fish
and wildlife values, as set forth by the court in Sierra v.
Sigler.
There are two levels of decisionmaking occurring
simultaneously for the Galveston project. The primary focus
of this discussion is on the isolated decision by the Corps
not to include a worst case analysis in the original EIS.
The larger decision, in part contingent on the worst case
decision, concerns the Corps' decision to permit port
construction. Prior to the analysis, a general discussion of
the environmental significance of the area is presented as
background. These considerations are not formally part of
the rational deductive decision as applied to the worst case
decision, yet they may have influenced the Corps' final
choice.
Environmental Values and Goals
Environmental Significance of the Area
The dominant environmental features of the Galveston Bay
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and Bolivar Peninsula areas are the beaches on the Gulf side
and coastal marshes of the East and Trinity Bay (see Fig.l).
High biological productivity characterizes the entire
Galveston Bay system. Estimates of the importance of the
area to biological systems vary, but are all significant. In
the trial court case, it was estimated that Galveston Bay is
the habitat, at least at some point in their life cycle, for
98% of Texas' commercial fisheries. Hann (4) estimates that
the majority of the coastal finfish and shellfish either live
entirely within the Bay or spend some part of their lifecycle
there. Nearly all are biologically dependent on biota
that live in the bay. Gulf Menhaden require bays and
estuaries for their rapid growth and develpoment stages (5);
Galveston Bay is the largest such area in the Gulf. Another
important commercial fish, the Bay Anchovy, is dependent on
estuaries and shallow Gulf water for spawning. Other fish
reliant upon the Galveston habitat include Sea Catfish, Sand
Seatrout and Atlantic Croaker. These fish depend on the
higher primary productivity in the estuary. Shallow waters
also protect developing fish from many open water predators.
The continental shelf extending seaward from the
Galveston shoreline is also a biologically productive region.
Both sport and commercial finfisheries are growing in
importance in the region although shrimping is still the
largest commercial catch by value (6). The Galveston port
project would be located within a major white shrimp zone
(7). These and other biota would be impacted by a major oil
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spill in the area. This discussion illustrates the
environmental significance of the study area. Galveston Bay
is biologically both abundant and varied and therefore
considered an area requiring environmental protection.
Environmental Values
In addition to the environmental significance of the
area based on the local ecology, sources of environmental
values include NEPA, its subsequent case law, and the Corps'
own statements and policies. These sources taken together,
justify the choice of environmental protection as an
important value system. It is not suggested that the Corps
arrived at its decision through this methodological approach,
although the relevant information was readily available to
the agency. It is instead presented as an ideal against
which to compare the actual decision.
As discussed above, the single most important piece of
environmental legislation pertaining to this and other
projects is NEPA. The Act states as one of its purposes the
enrichment of "the understanding of the ecological systems
and natural resources important to our nation". Title II
declares as national policy an assurance to future
generations of a safe environment. These, and similar
provisions of the Act arose from scientific testimony in
support of the concept that man's activity was having far-
reaching detrimental impact on the environment (8). Both
scientists and the pUblic have expressed concern over the
finite resilience and assimilative capacity of the
environment(9). Many authors (see Chapter Two) see the EIS
requirement not only as imposing procedural duties, but also
as requiring decision-makers to assess the substantive
impacts of projects in terms of ecosystem health and
productivity. NEPA also supports the notion that major
federal actions are to be taken based on rational,
comprehensive decisionmaking.
The importance of NEPA and its goals as significant
decisionmaking concepts has been upheld by executive input,
judicial interpretations, and further regulatory support.
The CEQ's "Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's
National Environmental Policy Act Regulations" states:
NEPA requires that impact statements, at a
minimum contain information to alert the public
and Congress to all known possible environmental
consequences of agency action. Thus, one of the
federal government's most important obligations
is to present to the fullest extent possible the
spectrum of consequences that may result from
agency decisions, and the details of their potential
consequences for the human environment.
The interpretations and applications of NEPA were
discussed in Chapter Two. The thrust of these cases, (e.g.
Calvert Cliffs, Strycker's Bay, Gillham Dam) is to require
consideration of socio-environmental values. One additional
recent case is worth mentioning at this point which
reinforces the importance of environmental considerations in
preparing EIS's, even at significant economic expense. In
SOCATS v. Clark, the court found that the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) must do a worst case analysis for an Oregon
herbicide spraying program since there was scientific
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uncertainty surrounding the carcinogenic and mutagenic
effects of the pesticide 2,4-D. BLM argued that the CEQ
regulations overstepped the limits of NEPA by requiring BLM
to perform research that would take at least five years and
cost the agency over five million dollars. However, the
court found that the "worst case analysis codifies prior NEPA
case law" (10) in requiring consideration of the
environmental impacts of the worst possible case.
Finally, environmental values are mentioned in both the
Corps statement of policy (11) and in the decision document--
the record of decision as required by CEQ regulations--
prepared by the Corps for the port project (12). These two
sources are especially important in comparing the Corps'
choice with the theoretically preferred alternative, since
they are in essence the first step in the rational-deductive
approach; these documents establish the value systems on
which the decision was based. The decision document, the
Corps' "Findings of Fact" for the Galveston port, claims to
have weighed the project benefits against its detrimental
impacts. The findings mention NEPA and its purpose. It
points to the Act as their "basic national mandate for the
protection of the environment". The primary environmental
concern discussed in this decision record is the potential
for serious oil spill impacts. The Corps' policy for
evaluating permit applications requires consideration of the
effects of the proposed project on "conservation, ••• esthetic,
general environmental concerns, historic values and
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fish and wildlife values". Although both the general
statement of policy and specific document issued for this
project claim that the CEQ guidelines are to be followed as
part of the decision process, the final determination
requires only that probable impacts be weighed and that the
project be in the national interest. The decision not to
include the worst case analysis is only one component of the
Corps' decision to permit port expansion. Whereas the
component decision may be analyzed within the framework of
the rational-deductive model, the larger decision carries
with it many of the shortcomings of the method discussed in
the last chapter. Problems in applying the model to the
decision to permit the port will be discussed in detail
later.
Taken together, NEPA, its history and resultant case
law, the Corps' general policy statement and the specific
decision document for this project, provide strong support
for the importance of considering environmental values. Once
they have been established, the rational-deductive approach
requires that the alternatives available to the decision
maker be addressed in terms of these goals and values. Two
major criticisms of the model are 1) that it is difficult to
gather information on every conceivable alternative available
to a decision-maker and 2) that different and often
conflicting value systems make it nearly impossible to choose
a "best" path. These difficulties are overcome in the
following discussion of the worst case decision by
52
considering environmental values only, and by limiting the
choices available to the Corps.
Discussion
The third, and most important step in the rational-
deductive approach involves deciding on the option that best
meets the stated goals. The choice to include or not to
include a worst case analysis can be approached by
considering the ramifications and reasons for and against
each alternative. It is axiomatic that the performance of a
worst case oil spill analysis would not have any negative
effect on the environment; if there are any environmental
consequences of carrying out the exercise of a worst case
analysis, they would be beneficial. In other words, the
inclusion of a worst case analysis, compared with the
alternative of its exclusion, is the option that best serves
the end of environmental protection. The following
discussion needs only to enumerate these potential or actual
benefits of including the analysis.
The primary benefit of performing a worst case oil spill
analysis concerns the preparation of control and
countermeasure plans. Although the probability of a total
cargo loss within the Bay is small, the scope of the project
creates the potential for oil spillage in association with
offshore loading and transportation operations. Recognizing
this potential, it becomes necessary to consider the
responsibilities of the spiller and the resources which would
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be involved in the amelioration response.
The first step in drawing up a contingency plan
against oil pollution must be to establish what
harm could be done by the oil and why it should
be cleaned up. (13)
The effects of oil on marine biota have been well
studied (14). The ability of organisms to recover from
certain impacts is also known, at least in general terms.
The greater the exposure, the greater the biological impact.
For example, preening by birds is affected by oil. The more
the bird is exposed, the greater the coat on its feathers.
The heavier the coat of oil on the bird, the greater its
disturbing effects on behavior. Birds have been known to die
due to the toxicity of the oil ingested in preening and
because the oil coating interferes with respiration (15).
For many organisms, the impact of spilled oil is quantity
dependent, ranging from minor behavior disturances to
mortality; for others, there is a threshhold response level.
In either case, the greater the oil spill, the more that
needs to be removed to assure safe residual levels. Also, a
larger quantity of spilled oil is more likely to cover more
surface area, impact more beaches and sink to cause greater
harm to benthic organisms. The FEIS for the Galveston
project recognizes most of these impacts; however they are
often accompanied by editorial comment downplaying their
importance. For example, following the EIS's discussion of
the biological impacts of oil spilled within Galveston Bay,
it states "because important commercial and sport fishes
generally avoid contaminated areas, the likelihood of severe
impacts is reduced. Also, the threat of oil spills would be
reduced on the upper Texas coast after completion of the
proposed project"(16). Or,"investigations of environmental
impacts of construction, dredging, operation and maintainance
of an onshore deepwater port at Galveston disclose no major
threat to the sensitive ecosystem of the area (17). Also,
when many of these claims are challenged in comments, the
Corps responds by simply reiterating the claims (18). This
indicates a lack of genuine committment to environmental
protection. This supports previous claims that the Corps
pays only lip service to sound environmental management. By
attempting to undervalue the apparent impact of the project
on biota, the Corps is sidestepping the rational process; the
value system is first established, then it is not given
objective treatment and action is not taken to promote the
stated goals.
An estimate of the maximum size of a potential spill is
also necessary in drawing up contingency plans (19). The
state of Texas" Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan requires the deployement of floating booms
and other devices such as skimmers and weirs as the initial
cleanup action. Simultaneously, methods and/or equipment for
removing the oil are to be put into operation (20). Clean
Gulf Associates, the co-op that would be responsible for
cleanup at Galveston, is an equipment-only co-op. Most of
the contracted personnel are employed in some capacity other
than oil spill clean-up; there is not enough business to
55
warrant full-time personnel for oil spill clean-up (21).
Each contractor can provide on the order of one hundred
people at one time. Therefore, although a number of oil
spill cooperatives are available to clean up spills in the
Texas coastal region, many of them are interdependent in the
case of a large spill (22). Their participation in emergency
situations may depend on contractual agreement prior to the
spill. Adequate preparation is an important beneficial
result of considering the impacts of the maximum potential
spill (i.e. a worst case scenario). The impacts associated
with a spill are largely a function of the size of the spill
which in turn is a function of the size of the draft of the
vessel, and determined by channel depth. Again, the FEIS
recognizes the importance of oil spill preparedness, but
qualifies most of the discussion on oil spill impacts by
claiming that oil spills in the "upper Texas coast" would be
reduced. For environmental protection purposes, the
introduction of major spills into Galveston Bay and the
increase in their potential size require greater
consideration. A worst case analysis would identify the
maximum potential damage port expansion could introduce into
the Galveston environment. The final determination need not
be based on this impact, although it is a component of the
decision to permit port expansion. However, the worst case
analysis has the benefit of alerting the Corps and port
authorities to potential oil impacts. With environmental
protection as a stated goal, the worst case analysis, rather
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than necessarily halt port construction, would allow for
proper mitigation provisions. Although environmental
protection was a stated goal, the treatment of oil spills in
the EIS does not meet that goal. Given its own declaration
of the importance of environmental protection, the Corps'
treatment of oil spills is less than rational. The
organization's approach more closely resembles the
incremental model in neglecting important possible effects
and by only taking actions incrementally different from those
already in existence. This approach to the worst case issue
is inappropriate given the stated objectives.
One might assume that Texas, with its long-term close
ties with the oil industry, would be prepared for any
eventuality in oil spill management. One argument presented
by the Corps claims that a worst case analysis was not
required because its possiblility is remote and that oil
spill preparedness is already very good for the Texas coast.
In terms of the theoretical models, this argument indicates
that the an incremental approach was appropriate. Numerous
spills in the past do not support this assumption. The Esso
Bayway spill, in the Neches Ship Channel resulted from the
ship overrunning its own anchor. The spill is noteworthy
because extensive worldwide marine casualty response program
planning had been carried out by the company involved. Even
with a relatively capable management team working on the
spill, sensitive marshland areas were protected from impact
only because of favorable wind conditions (23). The spill
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showed that site-specific planning for areas such as estuary
entrances was lacking. It also exposed poor oil spill
industry cooperative organization and contingency planning
for the entire area. The preparation of a worst case
analysis would hopefully promote contingency planning for a
catastrophic spill which in turn would increase the ability
of oil cleanup industries to deal with spills of all sizes.
In terms of the rational-deductive model, a worst case
analysis would again be the best choice to meet the stated
goal of environmental protection.
1979 was an especially bad year for oil spills in and
around Galveston. The poor response to these spills
indicate that better environmental protection is necessary in
the Galveston area. The Ixtoc oil well blowout in the Bay of
Campeche in June, 1979 was the world's largest known oil
spill, releasing between three and five million barrels or
well over 10,000 tons. Texas beaches and estuaries were
protected with booms, skimmers and manual cleanup operations
only near important beach resort areas. A policy for
cleaning Texas beaches was not established until
approximately 10,000 tons of oil had reached the the coast
(24). Again, if environmental protection is a goal of the
Corps, the Ixtoc spill demonstrates that better measures are
needed. Larger spills need to be considered to further the
goal of environmental protection. A better policy would be
one in which the impacts are considered before they occur.
This is what the worst case requirement is intended to
58
provide.
A major oil spill within Galveston Bay exposed
weaknesses in a "well-developed" government offshore
containment and removal package. There was no response for
four days following the collision of two ships-- the
freighter Mimosa and the Burmah Agate in November, 1979.
Again, according to Hann, the insufficiency of site specific
contingency plans for the area was apparent. Cleanup
personnel were contracted and protection measures were
designed only after the spill occurred. Again, preparation
of a worst case analysis would result in better planning and
preparation. All of the abovementioned spills occurred
between the time that work began on the PElS and the Corps'
decision to permit the port. This is significant since these
spills served to increase public awareness of oil spill
potentials. In other words, if these spills had not
occurred, there is a lesser probability that the public would
be bothered by potential oil spills. The following chapter
discusses the importance of public perception on this
project.
The most recent example of the destruction by oil in the
Galveston area is the spill of approximately one million
gallons of crude from the British tanker Alvenus in the
summer of 1984. This spill lead Governor Mark White to
appoint an advisory panel to review the state's response to
this and other spills. Again, the effect of the spill was
contemplated after the fact. Again, too, the effects
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could have been minimized by more thorough contingency
plans.
These examples, taken together, illustrate that the
probability of a large spill is not so remote as the Corps
seems to think and the potential for destruction is great.
Hannis arguments for the protection of the Texas coast
in general are even more compelling when considering the
development of a deepwater port. Another author writes: "the
move to large (super)tankers increases the hazard from any
single accident and the possibility grows that a single spill
from any of these large tankers might impair ••• maritime
resources ••• " (25). By introducing supertanker traffic into
a previously less trafficked estuary, the possibility of
major oil spills increases. However, rather than focusing on
introduction of tanker traffic within the bay, the Corps
chose to concentrate on their projected decrease in the
number of spills on the upper Texas coast. The Corps was
familiar with -- and bound by -- the environmental values
laid out earlier in this chapter. Given the choice of
including the worst case analysis or not, for environmental
reasons, rationality dictates that it should be done.
The Corps, in the EIS, discussed the "worst probable oil
spill", as opposed to the worst possible case spill. Such a
spill would involve thirty percent cargo loss from a VLCC.
The Corps asserted that a worst possible case analysis was
not required since 1) it was not probable, and 2) a
supertanker port had never been built in a sensitive
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estuarine area, so information on the effects was not
available and 3) a supertanker had never lost its entire
cargo at a superport in the u.s. before. These arguments
indicate that the Corps feels an obligation to consider the
environment, but that there are limits to its committment.
Again, it appears that an incremental approach was taken, and
indicates a preference for business as usual policies. This
is where the different goals acting on the agency make real-
life application of the rational-deductive model difficult.
In this academic treatment of solely environmental values,
limited to the choice of including the worst case analysis or
not, the rational-deductive approach is appropriate. In
practice, even if the agency hoped to do so, both time and
monetary constraints limit the Corps from considering every
environmental impact in its permit decision. These problems
of time and money are recognized by the CEQ regulations which
allow a worst case analysis to be done in lieu of analyses of
the full range of effects. The actual approach was probably
more similar to the incremental approach, in which action is
taken based on readily available information. Also, none of
the stated sources of environmental values require that
environmental issues be considered at the expense of other
considerations. The Corps is justified in not considering
every conceivable environmental impact in its decisionmaking.
However, in the EIS and in its statement of Policy, the Corps
obligates itself to perform the worst case analysis by
claiming to follow the CEQ regulations. Therefore, both
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legally and by its own application of the standards, the
Corps is required to do the analysis.
The worst case regulation is separated into two
requirements-- one concerning the environmental impact of a
catastrophic event and one concerning a probability estimate
of such an occurrence. In other words, an agency must first
indicate how the proposed action would affect the
environment, including a discussion of uncertain impacts and
unknown harms. It then must assess the probability of such
events. Therefore, if the probability of an impact is low,
it still does not free the agency from its obligation to
consider the impact of the worst case. In fact, the
appellate court found that "this case presents precisely the
type of situation for which the worst case regulation was
designed". Again, modus operandi and objectives were
established, yet not followed.
Much of the litigation in Sierra Club v. Sigler focuses
on the scientific uncertainty surrounding the effects of a
major oil spill. The appeals court ruled that enough
information existed from which to extrapolate the worst case
effects. It is generally agreed that the worst case would
wreak the same damage as any other large sized, uncontrolled
major oil spill (26), for which Galveston has been shown to
not be prepared. One of the most important advantages of
including a consideration of the worst case spill is in
drawing up contingency plans for the control of the spill, as
discussed previously. Scientific uncertainty is a
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problemmatic area of EIS preparation, as discussed in Chapter
Two. The CEQ regulations are intended to establish a way in
which to deal with such information gaps.
In an interview, the Corps reasoned that the exclusion
of the worst case analysis from the EIS was justified since a
worst case spill is possible "right now-- right today" (27).
Two supertankers could collide offshore and release a
catastrophic amount of oil, similar to the amount
hypothesized by the worst case scenario. A representative of
the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) agreed without
hesitation that a "worst case oil spill is a real
possibility--nowl" (28). Although the worst case regulation
was not in existence at the time LOOP was built, they claim
to have equipment and training capable of dealing with such a
spill. If a worst case spill is possible now, and attempts
at cleanup of smaller spills have proven inadequate in the
past, it is an even more pressing reason for considering the
fate and impacts of a catastrophic spill in the Galveston
EIS. Environmental values dictate that preparation be
thorough; at the very least they should be adequate to deal
with spills that have already occurred. The Corps' response
again indicates the limits of the agency's committment to
environmental protection. The value system of the Corps is
not as committed as the ideal system projected by the model.
Based on this discussion limited to environmental
considerations, the rational choice, i.e. that which best
meets the stated goals, would be to include the analysis.
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Although the Corps does not have an unqualified committment
to environmental protection, (nor should it) it does have an
excellent record of procedural compliance. The value system
of the Corps requires the final decision whether or not to
permit port expansion to be made on the basis of national
interest, considering the "probable impacts"(29) of the
project. However, the CEQ regulations are part of the
procedure to be followed in reaching their decision. By
claiming to follow the CEQ guidelines, i.e. by establishing
the value system or criteria by which the project should be
evaluated, in order to act rationally, the Corps was required
to include a worst case analysis. In this situation, the
Corps established objectives and did not chose the option
that best met the ends. Of the two models outlined in
Chapter Three, it appears as though the Corps approached its
oil spill considerations incrementally; they considered
spills similar to those that had occurred prior to the
preparation of the EIS. This approach was faulty on two
counts: 1) many of the largest oil spills in Texas history
occurred after work began on the EIS and 2) it was contrary
to the procedural requirements the Corps claimed to follow.
Summary
The rational-deductive approach requires that the
values/goals be set forth, the choices available be
considered and a decision be made based on both.
Environmental goals can be found by considering the substance
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of NEPA. A primary goal of NEPA, according to Anderson,
Baker, Kaming and Morrison, and Findlay and Farber (30),
among others, is to consider the effects of a project in
advance. Environmental values are also found in the
legislative history of NEPA, the CEQ regulations, case law
and in the Corps' statement of policy. The choices available
to the Corps are limited by the study design to either the
inclusion of exclusion of the worst case analysis. The
preparation of a worst case analysis could only have
beneficial results. These benefits would be secondary rather
than immediate, i.e. prevention and countermeasure plans
could only be complete if the effects of the worst possible
spill were disclosed in the analysis. Given the fact that
Texas oil spill contingency plans have proven inadequate in
the past, the construction of a new oil port seems to be a
logical point to reassess spill control and countermeasure
capabilities. To this end, the fate and effects of oil
spills of all sizes, including the worst possible spill, need
to be considered. Given the unique, sensitive estuarine
habitat of the Galveston area and the well-known effects of
oil on marine biota, complete contingency plans and proper
oil spill management capabilities are especially critical for
this project. This first analysis, limited to environmental
considerations, concludes that the inclusion of a worst case
analysis would have been the proper choice to further the
goals and values discussed. If the Corps' decision had been
based solely on environmental grounds, the worst case
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analysis would have been included. This very limited
application of the rational-deductive model reaches the same
conclusion, as the Court of Appeals in Sierra Club v. Sigler,
i.e., that a worst case analysis should have been done,
although this conclusion is based on primarily environmental
grounds, whereas the court's decision was based on legal
arguments. The court relied primarily on the procedural
requirement imposed by the CEQ. Environmental goals dictate
compliance, not only with the substantive provisions of NEPA,
but more generally with the broader substantive goals that
are independent of the Act.
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CHAPTER V
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Introduction
Although ostensibly, environmental arguments were behind
both the Sierra Club's and the Corps' views of the worst case
analysis, economic factors appear to have played at least as
large a role in influencing their outlook. This chapter
shows that, in the Galveston case, there were both economic
costs and benefits associated with the inclusion of a worst
case analysis, although they still do not explain its
exclusion.
This chapter applies the rational-deductive model to
economic considerations. It parallels the previous chapter.
First, sources and justifications of economic values relevant
to the Sigler case are presented. They are followed by a
discussion of the economic reasons and ramifications of a
worst case oil spill analysis in the context of the rational-
deductive model.
Economic Values and Goals
Economic Significance of the Port
Before considering economic values as they relate to the
worst case scenario and the formal analysis, the following
discussion provides a background of the importance of the
Port in the Galveston economy. The largest single employer
in Galveston (1), the port's development in the Galveston Bay
region has traditionally had a significant effect on regional
economic activity. For example, 35 million dollars were
spent on new or upgraded facilities between 1966 and 1973
(2). This expenditure represents 3.5 percent of the total
spent on all North American ports, and 19.3 percent of the
amount spent by all ports in the Gulf of Mexico during these
same years (3). The Port of Galveston currently functions
with a maximum ship capacity of 50,000 dwt. The five ports
to be served by the Pelican Island Terminal averaged 1.71
million bbl per day in 1979. Fearing dwindling domestic
supplies in the mid-1970's, the Corps anticipated increased
dependence on foreign imports, leading to greater activity
for Texas ports (4).
When and if the deepwater port becomes operational and
an integral part of the Galveston area economy, it is
estimated that the project would provide long-term economic
benefits in terms of increased incomes and employment. The
construction of the port and its associated facilities are
expected to boost the Galveston-Houston economy by
approximately 731 million dollars (5) in the short-term.
Employment increases for construction related jobs are
expected to number 2357. Another 2391 jobs are expected in
support-related industries. The Corps "Findings of Fact"
claim that approximately 36 million dollars per year in
economic benefits will be experienced by the Galveston- Texas
City SMSA's (6). Further, according to the EIS, the
availability of deepwater port facilities in the future would
benefit the nation, the state, local government, private
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business, and individual concerns since the deep-draft
facilities generate transportation savings. Additional
benefits cited in the EIS include increases in job
opportunities, improvements in the national balance-of-
payments by decreasing levels of future dollar outflows and
by increasing tax revenues on all levels. The EIS states
that "most of the socioeconomic impacts expected to result
from the proposed project are considered beneficial"(?).
Transportation costs would decrease due to smaller crew
size per ton of oil transported, fewer tankers required to
transport the oil, and savings associated with the
elimination of the need to transship the cargo into smaller
(approximately 50,000 dwt) tankers. An estimated savings of
twenty-three cents per barrel would be realized (8).
Small short term tax revenue increases are expected to
result from retail trade activity, especially during
construction of the port. According to the EIS, the local
tax base should increase because of increases in income and
employment resulting from the project.
Economic Values
In presenting the economic values that serve as a basis
for decision in the rational-deductive approach, NEPA again
is an important source. NEPA requires that the economic
justification for a given project must be identified.
Section 102(A) requires federal agencies to give "appropriate
consideration" to economic, as well as environmental and
technical considerations. The Act also declares as policy a
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committment to satisfy the economic requirements of present
and future generations. In order to achieve the goal of
economic well-being, the Act suggests achieving "a balance
between population and resource use which will permit high
standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities"
(9). In section 102(2) (B), NEPA recognizes "non-
quantifiable" factors or values that must be considered in an
impact statement. This recognition leads to the conclusion
that a qualitative balancing of costs and benefits is
required.
The recent CEQ regulations concerning the preparation of
EIS's also provide support for economic considerations,
stating that
(i)f the information relevant to adverse
impacts is not known ••• and the overall costs of
obtaining it are exhorbitant or ••• the means to
obtain it are not known (e.g., the means for
obtaining it are beyond the state of the art) the
agency shall weigh the need for action against
the risk and severity of possible adverse impacts
were the action to proceed in the face of
uncertainty. If the agency proceeds, it shall
include a worst case analysis (10).
The purpose of this regulation is to save agencies the cost
of considering the full range of effects by allowing them to
just consider the worst possible case. It was issued partly
in response to criticisms that administrative delay and
costs of implementing NEPA were "ensnarling the agencies in
paperwork, halting the progress of key federal programs and
causing considerable economic loss both to government and to
the private parties who must await governmental action before
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they themselves can act" (11).
The final places to look for support of economic values,
as they were for environmental values, are in the Corps'
statement of policy (12) and the decision document issued by
the Corps for this project. The latter document states that
the "scope of this inquiry regarding these effects has been
exceptionally broad and has included consideration of a wide
range of environmental, safety, economic and other values".
The first step in the ~ational-deductivemodel, goal
definition and justification, draws from the same sources as
the environmental analysis. NEPA and its subsequent
commentary as well as agency policy direct the Corps to
consider economic values in their decision.
Discussion
After establishing the validity of economics as an
important value system within which to approach the worst
case issue, the next steps are to identify the choices
available and determine which choice best meets the
established goal. Both economic costs and savings are
associated with the inclusion of a worst case analysis in the
Galveston port ElS. Therefore, both choices--the inclusion
and exclusion of the worst case analysis in the ElS-- need to
be considered. The negative ramifications (or costs) are
discussed first. There are at least three possible economic
reasons not to include the worst case analysis. The ultimate
reason may have been one, all, or a combination of these.
The first possible deterrent is the actual additional
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cost of performing the worst case analysis. The cost of
preparing an ElS is a common complaint among Federal
agencies. Charles Harbaugh of the Corps estimates the cost
of preparing the initial statement for the Galveston port at
between one million and two million dollars. He could only
estimate the additional cost of preparing the supplement "in
the thousands". However, these costs are not very
significant when compared with the total cost of the project
or its estimated benefits. Added to the preparation cost is
the additional cost of litigation.
Argued from another perspective, the costs of litigation
are a function of the Corps' failure to do the worst case
analysis in the FElS. In other words, litigation costs could
have been avoided by issuing a procedurally complete original
document. It appears that the Corps may not have had long-
range economic interests in mind when they chose to exclude
the worst case analysis. This points up another problem with
the application of the rational-deductive model: even within
the single value system of economics, short-term and long-
term considerations favor different choices. This is where
the contrasted incremental approach was operational. In
responding to an immediate oil shortage a "crisis response"
or short term remedy resulted. However, given the small
initial cost of preparing a worst case analysis relative to
the total cost of the project long-term considerations are a
preferable goal. It is also logical to consider costs over
the same time frame for which project benefits are expected.
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In addition to pointing up a problem with the theoretical
approach, this ommision indicates an even greater flaw in the
decision process. In spite of the Corps' long standing
committment to long range economic development, the agency
made a choice on the basis of short term economic
considerations. Again, the decision does not follow from the
stated objectives.
In a sense, the Corps provided their opposition with a
ready-made suit. At the outset of the EIS, the Corps
professes to follow the CEQ regulations, which had been
issued in draft form at the time the statement was issued.
"This statement has been prepared under the new Council on
Environmental Quality procedures ••• " (13). The draft
regulations exempted EIS's with drafts filed prior to their
issuance, although voluntary compliance was recommended. The
advisory guidelines that were in effect prior to these
regulations did not specifically require a worst case
analysis. Therefore, the Corps claimed in the Sigler case,
the EIS should not be reviewed under these regulations
since they were not law at the time the EIS was issued. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, points to the Corps'
voluntary compliance in Sierra Club v. Sigler, stating that
case law "requires that the court review the Corps' adherence
to these regulations ••. ". The court cited NRDC v. Callaway
(14), another case involving the Corps. In Callaway, the
Corps made specific reference to EPA ocean disposal criteria
and relied on them, at least in part, to support the issuance
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of a permit. The permit concerned inland waters, so the
ocean disposal criteria were not applicable. However, the
court ruled that "by its own use of the standards, it has
made them applicable in this case". In Sigler, litigation
costs could have be avoided by the Corps' not claiming to
follow the regulations or by complying more fully. As
discussed in the last chapter, this argument is analogous to
the major assumption in the rational-deductive ideal: if an
objective or value system is offerred, it is logical to
expect it to serve as a basis for decision. In this instance
the error is not with the model, but with the decision-
making logic.
Economic reasons for the inclusion of a worst case
analysis are often based on similar arguments against its
inclusion, but viewing the situation from a different
perspective. For example, it would have been less costly for
the worst case analysis to have been included in the original
document than in a supplement. "Thorough preparation in the
first instance is the most effective means to insure
expeditious procedural review and to avoid the need to redo
the work or project delay, rejection and economic
losses"(16). The "thousands" of dollars spent on the
supplement would not have been necessary had the initial
document been procedurally complete.
The second economic reason for not including a worst
case analysis is the result of one of the arguments in
support of including the analysis for environmental
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reasons. Better protection and countermeasure techniques
would result in the additional cost of providing for them,
i.e. the supply of booms, weirs, skimmers, etc. would need
to be increased. This cost is small relative to the rest of
the project and is unlikely to act as a deterrent to a
project of this magnitude. As stated above, LOOP claims to
have the capabilities to deal with a similar worst case
spill, even though that port was built prior to the CEQ worst
case requirement. The philosophy followed at the Louisiana
facility is that the minimal additional cost outlays for
additional equipment and training is a sound insurance
investment against the potential effects of a catastrophic
oil spill(15). This reasoning would be another example of
the subordination of long range goals to short term economic
considerations.
The Galveston Deepwater Port project involved additional
cost because of changes in demand for imported oil. The FEIS
found that the proposed port would be economically viable by
providing a more efficient way of handling imported oil. The
FEIS also recognized the variety in projected import
demands, depending on energy use and domestic production. In
response to a comment from the Department of the Interior in
the DEIS (17) concerning changes in imports, the Corps'
claims that the project is not dependent on increased
imports. Rather, the port would provide an alternate, more
efficient way of moving crude oil that would otherwise be
carried by smaller tankers. This is contrary to the original
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statement of purpose, which claims that the port would be
built to meet an increased demand for imported oil. The
Corps also claim that the port will have realized a
"substantial portion of its financial life" by 1990. A
"substantial portion of its financial life" has therefore
already been tied up in litigation and preparation of the
supplement. The FEIS justifies the need for the project by
claiming that "imports are expected to increase by at least
three times the currently imported amount by the 2000". The
deepwater port would be built to meet these needs. Current
import trends and more recent projections indicate that these
increases have not been forthcoming. The court bowed out of
this argument for legal reasons: "assessment of purely
economic costs and benefits fall within a wide area of agency
discretion not sUbject to reexamination by federal courts in
the guise of judicial review of agency action". Only if the
"economic justifications are, or have become so flawed as to
distort grossly the FEIS's presentation of environmental
consequences" can the court review economic considerations.
The economic standards on which the decision was made are
either faulty, or at least no longer valid. Therefore even
if the Corps had followed a rational path, the arguments
were not sound since the assumptions have proven untrue.
Every source interviewed, with the exception of the
Deputy Director of the Port at Galveston, agreed that the
viability of the port as an oil import facility has been
greatly diminished within the past few years. Discussing the
78
prospect of another Superport facility on the Texas Gulf
coast, a representative of LOOP expressed his belief that
there "is clearly no need for one" (18). The Louisiana port
is currently handling approximately fifty percent of the
projected throughput and half of what it was constructed to
handle. This source felt that the future oil import market
was not in supertankers. Much of u.s. imported oil comes
from Mexico, which exports in smaller tankers. The only hope
for LOOP to operate at its originally anticipated profit,
and for Galveston to be able to construct a deepwater port,
would be if Middle East crude prices were to drop
significantly below current levels and to remain low for an
extended time.
A Phillips Petroleum representative expressed doubt
whether any oil companies would back the Galveston project,
given current import conditions (19). He also suggested that
only long term increases in Middle East crude would be able
to sustain the project. His overall impression was that
"nothing is going to happen" with the project. Rather than
making a decision based on long-term, rational-comprehensive
planning, this project is suffering from the fact that it
originated as a short-sighted response to an immediate
crisis.
Even Charles Harbaugh of the Corps agreed that oil
imports have leveled off and are projected to stay level
(20). Since the delays from litigation, oil company backing
for the project has become virtually nonexistant.
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This response from the industry representatives is
exactly the result the plaintiffs had anticipated.
Representatives from the Sierra Club and E.D.F. wanted
consideration of the environmental effects of the worst case
spill, but more importantly, they hoped to delay the project
to the point where it was no longer economically worthwhile
(21). This tactic would not have worked had the Corps
followed the procedure it claimed to follow and made a
decision based the values it professed to support.
It should also be mentioned here that the Corps does not
have any immediate economic stake in this port's development.
Pelco, Chicago Iron and Steel and Northville Industries are
the private corporations responsible for the project; the
Corps is only acting as the permitting agency. In an
interview, the Corps representative said initially that "we
don't care if we issue the permit or not" (22), but later
retracted the sentiment. The Corps has an interest in the
port's development because they have projects that are
contingent on construction of a deepwater port at Galveston.
If the port is built, the Corps has plans to dredge further
up the Houston Ship Channel.
The theoretically favored choice, based on economic
values, is the inclusion of worst case analysis. Although
this analysis has been done with the benefit of hindsight,
all of the information utilized in the study was available
to the Corps in making their decision, with the possible
exception of a knowledge of recent import trends. At the
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time the EIS was issued, however, imports had already begun
to decrease. A large part of the discrepancy between the
expected outcome and the overall decision to issue the
permits can be attributed to shortcomings in the model. For
instance, virtually no real-life situation is as simple as
the limited application of the rational-deductive model in
this analysis. Even this simplified application faced the
problem of long-term versus short-term values. It is also
unrealistic to posit economic values unchallenged by other
considerations.
Criticisms of the economic validity of many Corps
projects were mentioned in Chapter Two. Although the
organization claims to have changed its approach to
development, actions speak differently. There are two levels
of decisionmaking involved in this case; one affects the
other. The decision whether or not to include the worst case
analysis is one component of the decision to permit the
project. If the Corps planned to permit the project
(regardless of whether that decision was economically or
environmentally sound), the effects of a worst case spill had
to be disclosed as part of the decision. This disclosure
could, in turn, effect the local public's support for the
project. Contrary to the commonly held view of the Corps as
an economically motivated organization, this study supports
the view that the organization is driven more by popular
political support than pure economics. Therefore, in many
ways, its decision-making is less than explicitly rational.
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Rather the agency establishes economic and environmental
criteria under which to operate and then mayor may not
satisfy these criteria; in fact, the decision may not be
based on these criteria. The following discussion shows that
even if political motivations were behind the Corps'
decision, the choice was still not rational, since the
actions do not support the desired ends.
Need for public support is critical in this and other
Corps projects. This dependence on pUblic support is
recognized by the Corps (22) and also by Galveston Wharves
and Pelican Terminal Corporation. These latter two groups
sponsored public meetings to inform the public about the need
for the proposed project and to hear the concerns of local
citizens. A resolution was passed in June, 1979 by Pelican
Terminal Corporation (Pelco). This company would provide the
funds to finance the project until the Terminal Project
Revenue Bonds and Channel Project Revenue Bonds become
available. The City of Galveston would issue and sell these
bonds to pay for "building, constructing, purchasing,
acquiring, improving, enlarging, extending, repairing,
maintaining, developing and operating" the port (23). The
Corps representative agreed that by publishing the possible
effects of a worst case scenario, the public may become more
frightened of the project. He felt that people would not
understand the difference between risk and probability (24)
which must both be considered as part of the CEQ requirement.
It is uncertain whether the local public would oppose
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a project solely on the grounds that it would present
potential environmental damage, especially if one considers
the number of people currently employed by the Port and the
additional jobs that would be created by its expansion. The
Galveston area has a long-standing reputation for being pro-
development. In regard to industrial development versus
pollution, one author writes:
"The citizens ••• do not seem to recognize their
own interests. Because the Bay lacks scenic
appeal, and because it has been unable to offer
the types of aquatic recreation found in other
estuaries, the people in the Galveston Bay area
have shown very little interest in its ecological
preservation." (25)
The decision document identifies the following as
supporters of the project: (then) Texas Governor William P.
Clements, u.s. Senator John Tower, and all concerned state
Congressmen. Mayor E. "Gus" Manuel of Galveston "strongly
support (ed) the project and has urged the community to
support it".
Environmental degradation associated with a major oil
spill would affect two important local industries-- tourism
and shrimping. Potential economic losses to these two trades
are likely to play a greater part in shaping public opinion
than are environmental concerns. Although the real impacts
of spilled oil on the local tourist trade have not been
established (26), a causal relationship between the two is
commonly assumed. Local newspaper articles have discussed
the economic impacts of oil on Galveston beaches. For
instance, members of the local community were reported to
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have lost more than one million dollars per day in diverted
tourist trade as a result of the spill from the British
tanker Alvenus (27). Fear of lost tourist trade was
responsible for concentrating the initial cleanup response to
the Ixtoc blowout almost exclusively on heavily visited beach
resort areas. The fact that all of the major spills in the
Gulf of Mexico occurred between the time the EIS was prepared
and when the case was brought to court presents an
interesting explanation of why the Corps may have expected
unchallanged public support for the project. It also
explains why the organization may have thought they could get
by without performing the analysis. The FEIS was written in
1978 and issued in 1979. 1979 was the worst year in Texas'
history for oil spills. The suit brought by the Sierra Club
in 1981 was likely triggered by the increased awareness of
environmental hazards created by recent spills. Prior to
these spills, it might have been easier for the Corps to
claim environmental protection as a goal without any
substantive change in practice. In terms of the model, the
irrationality of claiming a goal and not acting in accordance
with it stood a better chance of going unchallenged.
Although a system of values that favors public support and
local political backing for a project is not documented in
any of the laws or policies governing agency action, it is
common practice, and well documented in the case of the
Corps. In this instance, it appears as though these factors
were so strong as to prevail over both economic and
....... _..£ -~ ---.------ -- ---;J----- s:"----- -----------
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catastrophic impacts. They relied on the economics of
changing oil import demands. They hoped to delay the project
to the point where it was no longer economically viable.
Many industry representatives believe that that time has
corne. From an economic standpoint, the most pressing reason
for the inclusion of the analysis is to eliminate costly
project delay. If the decision whether to include or not to
include a worst case analysis had been based only on
economics, the rational deductive model would favor its
inclusion. Since the model's projections are contrary to the
Corps' action, it indicates that either the decision weighed
considerations other than economics and environment more
heavily and lor the decision was not rational.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
A study of the decision by the Corps of Engineers not to
include a worst case oil spill analysis in the Galveston
deepwater port EIS requires the integration of a variety of
disciplines and factors. This study has grouped the
considerations into environmental (including conservation,
esthetic, and fish and wildlife values) and economic
(or development) categories. Broadly construed, these two
systems encompass all of the involved groups. The major
controversy over port development took place between groups
representing these two interests. Chapter Three presented
the justification for this separation. Reasons include the
lack of overlap between the individuals and groups involved
in EIS preparation who are concerned with environmental
impacts and those who are interested in economic impacts, and
the incompatibility of the methods for evaluating economic
and environmental costs and benefits. In general, economic
interests favored port construction whereas environmental
interests made up the opposition.
Given the ecological and economic significance of the
Galveston Bay area to the state of Texas as well as the
economic and environmental impacts associated with the import
and export of oil, the construction of a deepwater port was
of concern to many people and groups. The potential for
environmental damage to biota due to spilled oil was the
major concern of environmental groups. The number of
previously proposed port projects as well as the number of
people employed indicate the economic importance of the port.
In addition to environmental damage to biota, spilled
oil would also negatively impact both commercial and sport
fisheries. To include a worst case oil spill analysis in the
EIS, the plaintiffs argued, would help prepare for-- and
therefore protect against-- potentially catastrophic impacts.
In not doing the analysis, the Corps left themselves
open to a lengthy and costly court suit. At the time the EIS
was issued, it was projected that construction of the port
would begin in 1980 or 1981. It was brought to court first
in 1981, the trial court ruled in 1982, and the case was
appealed in 1983. The supplemental EIS, with a worst case
analysis, is still being prepared (early 1986).
If, as quoted in Chapter Three, "much can be learned
from an attempt to relate the two worlds of academic and
political (and administrative) reflection", that relationship
needs to be explored. Although the rational-deductive
approach has served as a useful framework in which to study
the Corps' decision in an academic setting, problems with the
approach in practice are well documented in the literature of
decision theory. Problems in obtaining an exhaustive data
base, dealing with conflicting values, and determining
the relative significance of different values lessen the
utility of the model as a practical tool. These problems in
applying the model are more easily overcome by limiting the
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scope of the problem, an option available to an academic
researcher, but not usually to an administrator. By only
looking at the worst case question, and more importantly, by
considering opposing interests separately, the problem of
determining relative weights for conflicting values is
sidestepped. Also, the model is more appropriately applied
to larger policy questions. The case studied here is an
example of implementing an existing policy, rather than of
policy formulation. The worst case analysis is a very small
component of the overall decision by the Corps to issue
permits for port construction. It is the latter question that
would more appropriately be addressed by the rational-
deductive approach; the decision whether or not to issue
permits would justify the comprehensive information gathering
by the Corps required by the method.
However, the agency's stated approach to decision making
conforms closely with the rational approach. By establishing
the relevant statutes and agency intent and goals, the agency
attempts rational decision making. In contrast to the
incremental approach, a distinction is made between the goals
or objectives and a consideration of alternatives.
The EIS process allegedly serves as the rational-
deductive model's requisite means-end analysis. Through this
process, the appropriate action is chosen to meet the stated
goals. The comprehensiveness of this process by the Corps
was discussed in Chapter Two. Among federal agencies, the
Corps has demonstrated outstanding procedural performance.
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The evidence, including the stated actions, applicable
statutes, length of the ElS and duration of the ElS process,
indicates the Corps' decision was intended to be rational and
comprehensive.
However, within this model, there are many points where
rationality dictates a course of action different from the
one chosen. By the agency's own admission, both
environmental and economic considerations were important in
the decision process. The application of the rational-
deductive method to both the environmental and economic value
systems, however, concluded that the worst case analysis
should have been included in the ElS. This points up the
fact that different, even conflicting goals can both benefit
or both lose from the same policy decision.
Possible explanations for the exclusion of a worst case
oil spill analysis in the FElS include ignorance of the CEQ
regulation, misunderstanding or denial of the its
applicability to the Galveston project, and misunderstanding
over the extent to which the regulation was subject to
review. Given the newness of the regulation, the Corps had
no guideposts from which to determine how strictly the
requirement would be upheld. However, there is significant
evidence that the Corps was aware of the existence of the
regulations and furthermore properly understood them. The
Corps statement of Policy (33 CFR 320) makes specific
reference to them. The regulations are also expressly
mentioned in the FElS: "The statement has been prepared under
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the new Council on Environmental Quality procedures pUblished
in the Federal Register Wednesday, 29 November 1978". By
claiming to follow the regulations, and then not including a
worst case analysis, the Corps' actions deviated from the
rational model.
Another possibility is that the Corps was aware of the
regulations, but thought that the worst case analysis was
unnecessary. In fact, this was an answer given by the Corps
when asked why the analysis was not done (1). In the FEIS,
however, the Corps stated that the new CEQ guidelines
including the worst case analysis requirement would be
followed in the EIS preparation. It was not legally
necessary for the guidelines to be followed, since they had
not been approved yet. They were still guidelines at that
point and not the requirements they would become, although
voluntary compliance was urged. However, since the Corps
claimed to have followed the gUidelines, a worst case
analysis should have been included. The behavior of the
organization, in the context of the model, is not consistent;
standards were established, and then they were not pursued.
The political impact of pUblic perception explains in
large part why the worst case analysis was not done. Public
perception is important in this and other development
projects because construction and maintainance required the
sale of revenue bonds. Although the resolution to issue the
bonds specifically forbade the imposition of taxes to the
pUblic for repayment, the passage of the resolution was
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dependent on pUblic support. In addition, there is a strong
dependency of Corps' projects on support from local
Congresspersons, whose support, in turn, often reflects the
attitudes of the local pUblic. Although the "pork-barrel"
(3) politics of Corps projects usually involve federal funds
for a project, the close ties between Congress and the Corps
are likely to affect permitting of projects at a local level.
It is possible that the scare factor associated with
disclosing the worst case impacts, especially on the tourist
and shrimping trade, would have prevented the public from
approving the project. However, given the general pro-
development sentiment in the Galveston area, other industries
and individuals were either strongly in favor of the port, or
at least indifferent to its environmental impact. Knowing
the pro-development attitude of the area, yet fearing
diminished support from the important fishing and tourism
interests would be good reason for not pUblicizing the
effects of a catastrophic oil spill associated with the
project. This is a critical point -- it indicates that
regardless of the economically or environmentally preferred
choice, the potential for lost pUblic support was of
overriding concern. This credits the Corps with rationality
-- the choice served the desired end -- but it was based on a
value system other than that which the agency claimed to
pursue. Again, the short-term goal of saving the project
from opposition was achieved at the expense of the project.
One additional rational explanation concerns the
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relationship between the Corps and its constituent
industries. If the Corps was primarily concerned with
maintaining its relationship with these groups, at least the
appearance of pursuing their development goals is more
important than the actual long term benefits of the project.
Although the Corps has recently been credited with a
willingness to incorporate new (specifically environmental
protection) mandates, the Galveston district has less local
opposition, and therefore less reason to change old agency
operating procedures. By promoting the project in a
generally pro-developmemt region the Corps may have
been pursuing a calculated appeasement strategy. The
agency's major constituents could be satified while avoiding
political costs. Again, the decision is rational based on
maintaining these relationships, but not on stated goals.
From the research carried out for this study, the
exclusion of the analysis appears to be intentional rather
than accidental. Proof that the Corps was aware of the CEQ
regulation, its applicability to this case and of the
potentially catastrophic impacts of a massive spill were
found in the EIS, responses to comments in the DEIS and
confirmed in interviews. Perhaps the greatest discrepancy
can be found in the Corps' response to questions concerning
their awareness of these points. This leads to the
conclusion that the Corps contemplated performing the
analysis, then intentionally decided to leave it out. It
established the CEQ regulation as the appropriate standard
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and then chose not to follow it. The values are identified,
the options are considered, and the choice is not made based
on the options! The Corps has an admirable recent record of
procedural compliance; therefore, it was significant to find
them guilty of this kind of oversight. As discussed in
Chapter Two, it is easier to attack procedural non-compliance
than it is to target substantive agency decisions in court.
This inconsistency supports the assumption that the Corps
feared that the results of disclosing the worst case analysis
would be worse than the effects of procedural non-compliance.
Can these non-rational decisions be explained by the
alternative incremental model? According to Lindbloom, an
incremental decision maker does the following: 1) ignores
important possible outcomes, 2) ignores important alternative
policies, and 3) ignores important affected values.
Incrementalism is exhibited at various points in the Corps'
decision. Reasons why the problem was approached
incrementally include agency conservatism (the Galveston
district, in particular), political pressure, and perhaps, to
let this case serve as a trial.
For example, in considering oil spill possibilities and
impacts, the Corps used past spills as the basis for their
analyses. Because the possibility of a total cargo loss was
remote, the Corps made the argument that a worst case
analysis was not required. In fact, this was the ruling of
the district court in the trial case. However, this was
exactly the type of scenario at which the regulation was
aimed. Comments from the Department of Interior regarding
the inclusion of a worst case analysis were given the
following response: "If all those assumptions (total rupture
of all tankage, poor weather conditions, maximum recreational
activity and migration of important species) are made, the
probability of them occurring in that way become so small to
be speculative at best". The regulations explicitly separate
impact from probability, i.e., first the impacts of a
catastrophic amount of spilled should be considered and then
the probabilisty of such a spill. This treatment was
incremental in that the Corps chose to look at oil spill
impacts and probabilities similar to those that had already
occurred at the time the EIS was issued.
Another possibility is that the Corps may have thought
that they could get by without the analysis. The fact that
oil spill hazards on the Texas coast were only brought to the
public's attention after the EIS was prepared supports this
concept. The worst case regulation had never been the
sUbject of litigation before, so the Corps may have assumed
that these regulations were not going to be taken seriously.
Since the CEQ had only issued guidelines in the past, there
may have been some misunderstanding over the regulations and
the force with which they were to be applied. However, prior
legislation had given recently issued CEQ guidelines
"substantial deference" (2). It is significant to note that
regardless of the impacts of the worst case scenario, the
Corps need not necessarily have withheld the permits. As
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discussed above, the worst case requirement is a small
component of the EIS; the EIS, in turn, is only one component
of the District Engineer's decision. The final decision
document, which is a pUblic interest review of permit
applications, is based on an evaluation of the "probable
impacts". Since the worst case event is by definition one of
low probability, by its own permitting standards, the effects
of a worst case analysis would not have stopped the project.
The Corps' limited commitment to environmental
protection was demonstrated in Chapter Four. The incremental
approach allows important affected values to be ignored.
This, together with the fact that the worst case was not part
of the traditional EIS process, point to the incremental
method as playing an important part in the decision.
The reason that the decision turned out to be wrong in
terms of project viability is not only because of flaws in
decision making logic, but because of changes in external
circumstances (e.g oil prices and availability). Also, given
the newness of the regulation and the agency's understandable
reticence to apply it for fear of the public's reaction, the
Galveston project may have provided the agency with an ideal
test situation. In this case, the Corps could omit the worst
case analysis from the EIS for a private project and see if
and how strictly the requirement was going to be enforced.
It could test the new rule in this case without jeopardizing
either their own project or their relationship with the
permittees.
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A combination of the rational-deductive and the
incremental models is necessary to explain the Corps'
decision. However, there is an irrationality in the overall
process. The Corps claims to perform a comprehensive
analysis and relies on statutes and statements promoting
rational and comprehensive decision making. Therefore, the
agency's stated approach conforms with the rational model,
yet some of the most important aspects of the decision were
approached incrementally.
Lessons and Implications of the Study
In addition to understanding the agency's decision
making process, other themes may be generalized from this
study. Sigler presented agencies preparing EIS's with their
first example of the worst case rule applied. From this, and
subsequent cases citing Sigler, agencies will be better able
to gauge how the requirement applies to their situation.
Many of the lessons learned from the Sigler case
reinforce existing case law and custom. Whether the
"intent" of NEPA is primarily substantive or merely
procedural, litigation most often centers on the latter. No
responsible official would or should overlook procedural
requirements, especially requirements they profess to
follow. In this case the procedural requirement of the worst
case analysis was used by the opponents to achieve their goal
of halting the project. The general principle demonstrated
by Sigler is the effectiveness of NEPA in transferring
political power. Prior to NEPA, it would have been
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difficult, if not impossible, for an environmental group to
thwart a powerful bureaucracy and its consitituents.
Sierra Club v. Sigler demonstrated that NEPA case law is
still emerging. The court's interpretation of scientific
uncertainty and the need to consider the consequences of low
probability, catastrophic impacts have been applied in
subsequent cases.
With the uncertain future of the worst case regulation,
it remains to be seen how the precedent set in Sierra Club v.
Sigler will fare. The current CEQ has threatened to modify
or withdraw the regulations completely because of
misunderstanding or misuse (see Chapter Two-Westway project).
Since the worst case regulation was meant to codify previous
case law and also to simplify the EIS process, the
requirement may continue in practice, if not by name. In
other words, the substantive arguments for the worst case
analysis may continue, regardless of what happens to the
procedural CEQ requirement. The proposed revisions would not
likely affect cases like Sigler.
In some respects, the Corps may deserve more credit than
it is commonly given by environmentalists. Given the gross
conflict between the Corps original development mission and
the environmental quality considerations required by NEPA,
reconciliation of the two is a difficult task. Although
recent accounts of and by the Corps make it evident that
changes have occurred in the Corps' environmental
consideration of projects, the integration of these two value
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systems is still not refined. Significantly, however, if the
Corps decision is based on an internal set of values that
are subject to local political climate, rational and
consistent explanations of agency behavior are not possible.
If the actual value system on which decisions are made is
inconsistent with the stated goals, administrative behavior
is difficult to pattern and even more difficult to
anticipate.
One additional significant implication of this study
concerns the time scale of administrative decision making.
Two forces pUll the decision maker in opposite directions.
The first force is that of careful consideration and
deliberation over relevant factors for decision. The
other force is that of expediency. This case specifically
points up the importance of timely decisions. Rules and
regulations change -- often quickly, as evidenced by the
threatened withdrawal of the worst case regulation. It
should be emphasized, though, that the purpose of the
regulation is to speed up the decision-making process. This
is partially in recognition of changing economic realities.
For the Galveston project, changes in oil usage and
importation are likely to make the need for the project
obsolete before it ever gets built. Long term projections
are necessarily more speculative than short term; therefore,
it is more pressing that a project with professed long term
benefits become operational as soon as possible, thereby
assuring its operation when conditions are still predictable.
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From another vantage point, the administrative delay caused
by the Sigler litigation may in fact have been a blessing in
disguise, saving the industries involved from an unwise long
term investment.
Summary
The application of the rational-deductive approach to
both environmental and economic considerations leads to the
conclusion that a worst case analysis should have been
included in the original EIS. The environmental analysis
relied primarily on substantive arguments based on the
environmental protection that would result from better oil
spill control and countermeasure plans. The economic savings
that result from preparedness outweigh the minimal costs
associated with contingency planning and equipment. The
costs of litigation and, more importantly, of project delay
argue strongly in favor of including the analysis. These
economic arguments rely more heavily on the procedural
obligation imposed by the CEQ worst case regulation.
There are many possible reasons for the disagreement
between the choice suggested by the rational model and the
decision made by the Corps. Fear of losing needed public
support for the project is the favored explanation. The port
is a major employer and therefore receives a great deal of
political attention. The fact that oil spills on the Texas
coast became highly pUblicized only after work began on the
EIS may help explain why the Corps chose to exclude the worst
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case analysis. Given the changes in the economics of oil
importation, the choice to exclude the worst case analysis
has probably postponed the project too long for it to remain
an economically viable one.
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Notes for Chapter 6
1. C.R. Harbaugh, Environmental Resources Division,
Galveston District, USCE. Telephone Interview. september
21, 1984.
2. Andrus v. Sierra Club 442 U.S.C. 356
3. From George Laylock, The Dam BUi~ders (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1970), pp.6-7 : "Congressmen ••• need the Corps to
build their pork barrel projects, and the Corps needs
Congress to keep it in business. The Corps, although a
branch of the Defense Department, draws its life blood from
Congress. The symbiotic relationship between Congress and
the Corps is of long duration". See also, Mazmanian and
Nienaber, Can Organizations Change: Environmental Protection.
Citizen Protection and the Corps Qf Engineers (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979) p.12.
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